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Abstract
The Philippines confirmed local transmission of COVID-19 on 7 March 2020. We described
the characteristics and epidemiological time-to-event distributions for laboratory-confirmed
cases in the Philippines recorded up to 29 April 2020 and followed until 22 May 2020. The
median age of 8212 cases was 46 years (IQR 32–61), with 46.2% being female and 68.8% living
in the National Capital Region. Health care workers represented 24.7% of all detected infec-
tions. Mean length of hospitalisation for those who were discharged or died were 16.00 days
(95% CI 15.48–16.54) and 7.27 days (95% CI 6.59–8.24). Mean duration of illness was 26.66
days (95% CI 26.06–27.28) and 12.61 days (95% CI 11.88–13.37) for those who recovered or
died. Mean serial interval was 6.90 days (95% CI 5.81–8.41). Epidemic doubling time prior to
the enhanced community quarantine (ECQ; 11 February and 19 March) was 4.86 days (95%
CI 4.67–5.07) and the reproductive number was 2.41 (95% CI 2.33–2.48). During the ECQ
(20 March to 9 April), doubling time was 12.97 days (95% CI 12.57–13.39) and the reproductive
number was 0.89 (95% CI 0.78–1.02).
Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was declared a global pandemic by the World Health
Organization (WHO) on 12 March 2020 [1]. Current and published epidemiological research
on COVID-19 has largely focused on China and other high-income countries such as South
Korea, Japan, the USA, Italy and Spain [2]. Further research on the distribution and burden of
COVID-19 in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) may give insight on its disease epi-
demiology in low-resource settings as transmission dynamics are dependent not only on popu-
lation characteristics [3], but also health system capacity (e.g. access to testing) [4], and the ability
to implement mitigation measures (e.g. community-level quarantine, social distancing) [5].
The Philippines confirmed local transmission of COVID-19 on 7 March 2020 and imple-
mented enhanced community quarantines (ECQ) from 20 March to 30 April on half the coun-
try’s population [6]. ECQ entailed very strict community-level social and physical distancing
measures such as suspension of public transportation, prohibition of intra-country travel and
restriction of people to their homes except for essential activities like food and health care [7].
In this paper, we describe the epidemiological profile and transmission dynamics of the
first 8212 confirmed COVID-19 cases in the Philippines.
Methods
Overview of the Philippine COVID-19 surveillance system
The Philippines is an archipelago of three island groups and 17 regions subdivided into 81
provinces covering 146 cities and 1488 municipalities [8]. COVID-19 surveillance, like major-
ity of health service delivery, is decentralised to local government units (LGUs), i.e. provinces,
cities and municipalities. Epidemiology and surveillance units (ESUs) exist in every adminis-
trative level, namely regional ESUs (RESUs), provincial ESUs (PESUs) and city/municipality
ESUs (CESUs/MESUs). Units collect data for their jurisdictions and report to higher level
units: CESUs/MESUs cascade daily updates to the PESUs, which cascade those to regional
ESUs which then finally submit to the DOH-Epidemiology Bureau (EB) [9, 10]. The 15 cities
and one municipality in the National Capital Region (NCR), as well as 37 highly urbanised
cities and independent component cities are not overseen by a provincial government, and
report directly to the RESUs.
The DOH-EB is the lead national agency for COVID-19 surveillance. It collates data on
confirmed and suspected cases nationwide and provides guidance and support to all LGUs.
DOH-EB maintains an information system for COVID-19 cases patterned after influenza-like
illness (ILI)/severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) surveillance. Confirmed cases are
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profiled using case investigation forms (CIF), which record
patient characteristics, epidemiologic links and select clinical
information.
The CIFs include questions on occupation which are used to
identify healthcare workers. Only those actively working in a hos-
pital or a health facility were considered as healthcare workers for
this analysis. We did not include those who may hold degrees in
health professions, but were not in active service. Health care
worker status is confirmed and validated by dedicated surveillance
teams in LGUs and DOH-EB given that healthcare workers who
die or experience severe or critical symptoms receive additional
compensation under the ‘Bayanihan to Heal As One’ Act passed
in April 2020 [11].
Case definition, case detection and laboratory testing
We define COVID-19 cases as patients with positive real-time
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) con-
ducted by laboratories accredited by the DOH and Research
Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) [12, 13]. The RITM is the
National Reference Laboratory for Emerging and Re-emerging
Diseases and it is the public health authority that accredits laborator-
ies for COVID-19 testing. We included cases recorded up to 29 April
2020 at the time of writing and followed the status of these patients
until 22 May 2020 using the latest dataset prior to publication.
Starting 9 April 2020, the DOH limits testing to suspect and
probable cases. A suspect case is a person who has any of the fol-
lowing: (1) SARI requiring hospitalisation with no other aetiology
that fully explains clinical presentation; (2) ILI with no other aeti-
ology that fully explains clinical presentation AND residence or tra-
vel to an area with known local transmission 14 days prior to
symptoms OR exposure to confirmed or probable cases during
the period 2 days prior to symptoms until they test negative with
RT-PCR; and (3) high-risk groups presenting with fever, cough,
shortness of breath and other respiratory symptoms, including
the elderly 60 years and above, those with comorbidities, women
with high-risk pregnancies and health workers [14]. Probable
cases are suspect cases (1) referred for RT-PCR testing, (2) with
inconclusive RT-PCR results from a DOH-accredited laboratory,
or (3) who have a positive RT-PCR result from a non-RITM accre-
dited laboratory. As of 29 April, there have been six versions of
COVID-19 case definitions and testing has expanded to include
17 subnational laboratories (see Supplementary Appendix).
Potential cases are detected through multiple avenues. At ports
of entry, the DOH – Bureau of Quarantine identifies persons
showing symptoms such as fever, shortness of breath and respira-
tory problems and refers them to health facilities, LGU health
offices or sentinel disease reporting units (DRUs). Health provi-
ders also use official case definitions to assess potential
COVID-19 cases among patients who consult or are hospitalised
in their facilities. LGUs, ESUs and DRUs then conduct case inves-
tigations and contact tracing for reported confirmed, suspect and
probable COVID-19 cases [14].
Death was defined as death due to active COVID-19 and
reported as dead by the DOH-EB. An internal team of medical
experts at DOH-EB reviews death certificate data, if available, or
the data transmitted through the information system by the health
facility or ESUs, to validate if the cause of death was related to
COVID-19. Recovery was defined as COVID-19 cases reported
as recovered by the DOH-EB based on the resolution of symptoms,
including discharge from hospital for those admitted or end of
home quarantine for those not admitted, and at least one negative
RT-PCR test. We allowed 3 weeks of follow-up (29 April to 22 May
2020) to ascertain health outcomes to account for the usual time in
which we expect either recoveries or deaths [15].
All data are available as part of the DOH’s open data access
‘DataDrop’ initiative, updated daily at https://ncovtracker.doh.
gov.ph. Some of the additional variables such as health worker
status and known comorbidities were requested separately from
DOH-EB and received by the authors as deidentified data.
Statistical analysis
We analysed descriptive statistics of cases, deaths and recoveries
by socio-demographics, symptoms at specimen collection and
health care worker status to the extent that these data were avail-
able. Epidemic curves were constructed using the date of symp-
tom onset. As many dates were missing, they were imputed
based on the method by Günther et al. as applied to the
COVID-19 outbreak in Bavaria, Germany [16]. A flexible, gener-
alised additive model with a Weibull distribution was fitted for the
days between symptom onset and DOH public announcement.
Predictors were: (1) day of week of reporting, (2) region of resi-
dence, (3) laboratory of testing, (4) sex; and the following
smoothed predictors: (5) calendar week of reporting date; and
(6) age (Supplementary Appendix). The imputed data set was
used for all further analyses.
Among a subset of cases with complete data, we estimated the
distributions of six time-to-event variables: (1) serial interval, or
time between symptom onset of index and secondary cases; (2)
health-seeking behavioural delays, or time between symptom
onset and first medical consultation (or specimen collection if miss-
ing); (3) diagnostic delays, or time between specimen collection (or
first medical consultation if missing) and laboratory confirmation;
(4) hospital length of stay for admitted cases, or time between
admission and discharge (or death for those who died); (5) length
of condition, or time between symptom onset and death or recov-
ery; (6) reporting delays for confirmed cases, or time between
laboratory confirmation and public announcement. To calculate
the serial interval, clustering analysis was done using known epide-
miologic links, exposure history and symptom onset for the first 100
confirmed COVID-19 cases where contact tracing was mandated by
DOH guidelines [17]. Distributions that best fit the data were iden-
tified using the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Exponential growth rates, epidemic doubling times and repro-
ductive numbers (basic reproductive number (R0) and effective
reproductive number (Re)) were calculated, accounting for the
empirical serial interval of our data [18, 19]. R0 was estimated
during the exponential growth period using the method devel-
oped by Wallinga and Lipsitch [20], with the best fit of dates
determined by the deviance-based R2 statistic [21]. Re was esti-
mated using the Wallinga and Teunis method during the period
after ECQ was mandated [22].
Analyses and visualisations were done using Stata 16.1
(College Station, TX, USA: StataCorp LP), Tableau Desktop
2020.1.3 (Mountain View, CA, USA: Tableau Software, Inc) and
R 4.0.0 [23] using the EpiEstim [24], epitools [25], fitdistrplus
[26], gamlss [27] and MASS [28] packages.
Ethics approval
Data came from continuing surveillance efforts by the DOH-EB
as part of an ongoing outbreak investigation. Thus, institutional
review board approval was deemed unnecessary.
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Results
Among the 8212 COVID-19 cases detected in the Philippines up
to 29 April 2020, 46.2% were female and 68.8% lived in the NCR
(Table 1). Among these, 768 (9.4%) died and 2988 (36.4%) recov-
ered. Median age for cases, deaths and recoveries was 46 years
(IQR 32–61), 66 years (IQR 57–74) and 46 years (IQR 32–59).
There were 319 (3.9%) cases and 12 deaths among those aged
0–20 years. Health care workers represent 24.7% of detected infec-
tions with 35 deaths. Hypertension (17.9%) and diabetes (12.7%)
were the most common comorbidities while fever (31.3%) and
cough (44.9%) were the most common symptoms at specimen
collection. Compared to those who recovered, those who died
were more likely to be older, male, presented with difficulty
breathing and had comorbidities except for asthma.
The epidemic curves based on symptom onset shows that the
exponential growth period of the outbreak likely began on 11
February 2020 (Fig. 1). Only 5168 (63.0%) cases had complete
dates of symptom onset and the rest were imputed (see
Supplementary Appendix for model diagnostics). Several cases
(3.5%) visited a country with known local transmission 14 days
prior to their symptoms. New cases steadily increased until the
week of 15 March 2020 when NCR and Luzon were put under
ECQ. Detected cases rose during this period likely due to the
expansion of laboratory testing capacity in the last week of
March. The decreases in the last weeks leading up to 29 April
were likely due to delays between symptom onset and public
announcement – and not due to a true decline in new infections.
Figure 2 and Supplementary Appendix present the distribu-
tions for six key epidemiologic events and surveillance delays
from symptom onset to public announcement in the Philippine
health system. The serial interval had a mean of 6.90 days (95%
CI 5.81–8.41; Weibull) using 55 pairs of index and secondary
cases. The mean health-seeking behavioural delay or time between
illness onset and first medical consultation was 6.75 days (95% CI
6.70–7.15; γ). The mean diagnostic delay or time between specimen
collection to laboratory confirmation was 4.92 days (95% CI 4.82–
5.02; lognormal). Among those who were hospitalised, the mean
length of stay for recoveries was 16.00 days (95% CI 15.48–16.54;
Weibull) while for deaths was 7.27 days (95% CI 6.59–8.24; γ).
Among those who had recovered or died, the mean duration of ill-
ness with COVID-19 was 26.66 days (95% CI 26.06–27.28; Weibull)
and 12.61 days (95% CI 11.88–13.37; γ), respectively. Lastly, mean
reporting delays or the time between laboratory confirmation and
public announcement was 2.47 (95% CI 2.40–2.51; γ). Notably,
these delays were such that of the 541 deaths with complete data
on date of death and laboratory confirmation, half of them (276,
51%) received laboratory confirmation after they had died.
Figure 3 presents three of the largest known clusters. Cluster
A’s likely source of infection was the wake of a cases’









46 (32–61) 66 (57–74) 46 (32–59)
Age group, n (%)
0–10 years old 133 (1.6) 7 (0.9) 30 (1.0)
11–20 years old 186 (2.3) 5 (0.7) 39 (1.3)
21–40 years old 3032 (36.9) 32 (4.2) 1181 (39.5)
41–60 years old 2761 (33.6) 216 (28.1) 1049 (35.1)
60–80 years old 1884 (22.9) 415 (54.0) 653 (21.9)
80+ years old 210 (2.6) 93 (12.1) 35 (1.2)
Unknown 6 (0.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.03)
Females, n (%) 3791 (46.2) 266 (34.6) 1418 (47.5)
Healthcare worker, n (%)
Doctors 614 (7.5) 27 (3.5) 372 (12.5)
Nurses 726 (8.8) 6 (0.8) 369 (12.4)
Allied health
professionals
687 (8.4) 2 (0.3) 340 (11.4)




5649 (68.8) 572 (74.5) 2188 (73.2)
Luzon without
NCR
1726 (21.0) 143 (18.6) 555 (18.6)
Visayas 623 (7.6) 24 (3.1) 110 (3.7)
Mindanao 182 (2.2) 29 (3.8) 132 (4.4)
Unknown 32 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)




276 (3.4) 23 (3.0) 175 (5.9)
No foreign travel 5709 (69.5) 562 (73.2) 2561 (85.7)
Unknown 2227 (27.1) 183 (23.8) 252 (8.4)
Comorbidities, n (%)
Hypertension 1468 (17.9) 264 (34.4) 723 (24.2)
Diabetes 1045 (12.7) 217 (28.3) 499 (16.7)
Renal disease 183 (2.2) 53 (6.9) 63 (2.1)
Cardiovascular
disease
263 (3.2) 92 (12.0) 113 (3.8)
Cancer 79 (1.0) 18 (2.3) 33 (1.1)
COPD 36 (0.4) 12 (1.6) 13 (0.4)
Tuberculosis 83 (1.0) 17 (2.2) 35 (1.2)
Asthma 263 (3.2) 22 (2.9) 146 (4.9)
Unknown 4301 (52.4) 269 (35.0) 1045 (35.0)
Signs and symptoms, n (%)
Fever 2573 (31.3) 363 (47.3) 1270 (42.5)











1806 (22.0) 416 (54.2) 737 (24.7)
Sore throat 1638 (20.0) 83 (10.8) 847 (28.4)
Diarrhoea 584 (7.1) 43 (5.6) 321 (10.7)
Unknown 3188 (38.8) 79 (14.2) 44 (4.3)
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mother-in-law; it was also plausible the first generation of cases
had multiple points of contact before and after the wake given
that they were all friends and family. The second generation
cases were household members of first generation cases, save for
one who infected a high-level government official. Cluster B
and C’s likely sources of infection were birthday parties, and simi-
lar to Cluster A, infected the rest of their household. Aside from
friends and family, other known epidemiological links are
between cases and their attending health care providers, such as
the one found in Cluster A.
Fig. 1. Onset of illness among the first 8212 COVID-19 cases in the Philippines, the National Capital Region, and Region 7.
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In the exponential growth phase pre-ECQ (11 February and 19
March), the epidemic growth rate was 0.143 per day (95% CI
0.137–0.149), and the epidemic doubling time was 4.86 days
(95% CI 4.67–5.07). Using the estimated serial interval distribu-
tion, the basic reproductive number for this period was 2.41
(95% CI 2.33–2.48). Analysis for the ECQ period was limited to
April 15 to account for reporting delays. In the period of 20
March to 15 April, the epidemic growth rate was 0.053 per day
(95% CI 0.052–0.055), the epidemic doubling time was 12.97
days (95% CI 12.57–13.39) and the average daily effective repro-
ductive number was 0.89 (95% CI 0.78–1.02).
Discussion
This overview of the first 3 months of the COVID-19 outbreak in
the Philippines provides a unique perspective on the transmission
of COVID-19 in a health system with limitations in surveillance,
testing and service delivery. Such information may aid modelling
or data analyses efforts for outbreak response in the Philippines
and countries with similar health system constraints as studies
of the pandemic outside of high-income countries and in
LMICs have been limited.
Our results support findings that COVID-19 disproportion-
ately burdens older age groups, healthcare workers and densely
populated urban areas [29–31]. Outbreak epicentres in the
Philippines were urban centres, such as NCR and Cebu City,
where NCR alone accounted for more than two-thirds of all
cases. NCR is the fifth most densely populated metropolis in
the world [32]. The first few cases were likely imported into
these urban centres, as approximately one-tenth of the population
are migrant workers and 8 million tourists visit annually [33].
In the Philippines, one in four confirmed cases were healthcare
workers, much higher than the Western Pacific regional average
of 2–3% [34]. The high proportion of healthcare workers as a
Fig. 2. Time-to-Event Distributions for key epidemiologic events and surveillance delays. (a) Serial interval or the time between onset of symptoms for index and
secondary cases. (b) Behavioural delay or time between symptom onset to first medical consultation. (c) Diagnostic delay or time between illness onset to labora-
tory confirmation for COVID-19. (d) Length of stay or time from hospitalisation to discharge (blue) or death (red). (e) Length of condition or time from symptom
onset to recovery (blue) or death (red). (f) Reporting delay or time between laboratory confirmation to public announcement by DOH.
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Fig. 3. Some known large Covid-19 outbreak clusters in the Philippines.
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share of cases may indicate poor compliance with infection con-
trol protocols and shortages of personal protective equipment
[35–38]. To note, healthcare workers may also have had better
access to testing early in the outbreak and COVID-19 infection
in one may trigger testing or surveillance among other healthcare
workers to limit hospital outbreaks. Further investigation is neces-
sary to identify exposure sources, gaps in infection control and
facilitators of hospital outbreaks.
In the Philippines, surveillance delays were prominent due to
the limited healthcare system capacity which affects the timeliness
of decisions to suppress the outbreak. For example, on 7 March,
the DOH officially reported local transmission upon public
announcement of the sixth case [39, 40], but our findings suggest
that the exponential growth period likely began more than 3
weeks earlier. Delays also affect rapid isolation of suspected
cases, which is critical to reduce the reproductive number to
below 1 and suppress the outbreak. To reduce health-seeking
behavioural delays, the National Health Insurance Program, of
which all Filipinos are members under the newly passed
Universal Health Care Law, has made laboratory testing free
[41], and covers the majority of community isolation and hospi-
talisation costs since mid-April [42–44], To reduce diagnostic
delays, the Philippines has slowly expanded laboratory capacity
from just one laboratory in February. More isolation facilities,
such as stadiums, hotels and schools, have been set-up for mild
cases to save limited hospital resources for severe and critical
cases. Information systems are being strengthened to allow syn-
chronised reporting of cases at all ESU levels in real time.
Our analysis also showed that the prior to the ECQ reproduct-
ive number was 2.4, meaning that for every confirmed case,
between two and three other cases were infected. This estimate
is similar to previous estimates in literature [45]. Travel restric-
tions imposed for China and South Korea in February may not
have been sufficient to slow the progression of the outbreak, as
the reproductive number remained around 2.4 during the period
before ECQs were implemented. While full travel restrictions and
the ECQ decreased the reproductive number to 0.9, these inter-
ventions merely delayed the progression of the outbreak rather
than stopping it completely. Furthermore, the serial interval esti-
mate of 7 days is longer but comparable to previous estimates in
other settings [46].
This study has limitations common in disease outbreak
response and health information systems in LMICs. First, there
is a large number of missing data that needs to be further vali-
dated due to difficulties of retrieving data from a decentralised
surveillance system. At the time of this study, data were mostly
from paper CIF and not medical records. As such, we did not
have detailed clinical information on disease severity or disease
progression, and comorbidities may be underestimated. Only
63% of cases reported their date of symptom onset; however,
we implemented a previously validated imputation method to
correctly specify the epidemic curve and better estimate the repro-
ductive number. Second, the focus of laboratory testing for early
phases of the Philippine outbreak was on severe or critical cases,
but the DOH has since expanded testing for those with milder
symptoms. Since more milder cases were captured by the surveil-
lance system during the latter part of the outbreak, mean surveil-
lance delays, length of stay and duration of illness may have
declined as health system capacity improves. Thus, our estimates
of the epidemiologic time-to-events and surveillance delays may
be overestimated. In addition, the case counts, recoveries and
deaths may be artificially undercounted due to underreporting
of mild cases, missed asymptomatic cases, backlogs in confirma-
tory testing, and delays and errors in reporting and validating for
recoveries and deaths. While 3 weeks were allotted as follow-up
period for deaths and recoveries, some censoring still likely
occurred for those with longer length of condition. Thus, we
did not calculate the case fatality rate due to these potential biases.
Fourth, we could not compute the event attack rates for the clus-
ters illustrated in Figure 3 due to incomplete data on the total
number of people in each gathering. Hence, these clusters serve
only to illustrate the largest COVID-19 clusters identified by the
DOH-EB in the early phases of the outbreak in the Philippines.
Finally, there may be additional differential ascertainment in
the characteristics of cases due to disparities in access to care;
individuals with higher socioeconomic status, health care workers
and workers with occupations who are able to stay sick at home
may be more likely to test and seek care, even though socially dis-
advantaged communities may have increased susceptibility to
COVID-19 [47].
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can
be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268820002137
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